Bank branch presence and access to credit in low-to-moderate income neighborhoods by O. Emre Ergungor
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
06  16
Bank Branch Presence and Access to 
Credit in Low-to-Moderate Income 
Neighborhoods
by O. Emre ErgungorWorking papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials 
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not 
have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland publications. The views stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily 
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
 
Working papers are now available electronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on the World 
Wide Web: www.clevelandfed.org/research. 
 
 
 O. Emre Ergungor is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and can be reached 
at ozgur.e.ergungor@clev.frb.org or 216-579-3004.  





Bank Branch Presence and Access to Credit in  
Low-to-Moderate Income Neighborhoods 





Banks specialize in lending to informationally opaque borrowers by collecting soft 
information about them.  Some researchers claim that this process requires a physical 
presence in the market to lower information collection costs.  I provide evidence in 
support of this argument in the mortgage market for low-income borrowers.  Mortgage 
originations increase and interest spreads decline when there is a bank branch located in a 
low-to-moderate income neighborhood. 
 
Keywords: Access to credit, branch proximity   1
1. Introduction 
Access to credit is vital for the poor.  Credit insures individuals against liquidity 
shocks, prevents unnecessary liquidation of illiquid investments, and channels savings 
from unproductive liquid assets toward investments in productive capital (Bencivenga 
and Smith, 1991).  This process helps the poor because the ability to invest in productive 
assets and the associated increase in wealth encourage investment in human capital by 
the young generations, increasing the productivity of the poor and boosting their quality 
of life (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Wolfensohn and Bourguignon, 2004). 
However, informational frictions could make credit prohibitively expensive or 
outright rationed (à la Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) in low-income areas where credit 
histories are tainted by past problems or simply non-existent.
1  In this paper, I 
investigate whether banks play a role in alleviating these frictions by collecting soft 
information about their customers (i.e. information that is difficult to express in hard 
numbers, such as honesty and diligence) and making credit more accessible.  One way 
to determine whether soft information is playing any role in the lending market is to 
examine how the distance between the lender and the borrower affects the availability 
and terms of credit  (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Hauswald 
and Marquez, 2006; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006).  So, I ask the following question in 
this paper: How does access to a bank branch affect the availability and cost of credit in 
low-income neighborhoods? 
Using mortgage data disclosed by lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) of 1975 and reported by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council, I find a strong positive relationship between bank branch presence in low-
income neighborhoods (a measure I develop to capture the number of branches inside 
and around a neighborhood) and mortgage originations and a strong negative 
relationship between branch presence and mortgage spreads over maturity-matched 
Treasury securities. 
                                                           
1 Estimates for these types of consumers vary between 10 and 22 million households. 
“Innovations in Personal Finance for the Unbanked: Emerging Practices from the Field”, Fannie Mae 
Foundation Case Studies, 2003.   2
I also find that the favorable effects of branch presence get stronger as the branch 
gets closer to the neighborhood.  These findings reinforce earlier evidence presented by 
Petersen and Rajan (1994), which suggests that in the small-business-lending market, 
relationships are associated with greater availability of credit.  By contrast, I find that 
branch presence is not correlated with mortgage availability in high-income 
neighborhoods, where borrowers are more likely to qualify for credit-scored mortgages. 
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature.  First, it 
complements studies that seek to identify the role played by financial intermediaries in 
alleviating poverty.  Cross-country studies have  shown that financial development 
alleviates poverty and reduces income inequality (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 
2004).  Yet the mechanism through which financial development plays its favorable role 
is unclear.  The mechanisms proposed by studies of microlending and proven effective --
-peer monitoring, mutual insurance, etc. --- have not always been successfully replicated 
in other countries (MkNelly and Dunford, 1998, 1999; Conlin, 1999).2  Even when they 
are successful, the reach of these programs remains tiny relative to the population (less 
than 2 percent of the population is served in developing countries), and their survival is 
mostly dependent on government or donor subsidies (Honohan, 2004a).  My 
contribution is that I propose a mechanism---relationship lending---that does not suffer 
from any of these encumbrances.  It is managed by mainstream financial intermediaries 
and it has been shown to alleviate information frictions in the small-business loan 
market, where borrowers’ informational opacity is a well-known problem. 
The second contribution of the paper is that it expands the relationship-lending 
literature.  This literature has focused exclusively on the funding needs of small 
businesses and has attempted to show how relationships between banks and borrowers 
ease informational frictions in the lending market and thus allow greater access to credit. 
However, the evidence has not provided an unqualified support for the relationship 
                                                           
2 Microloans are small loans (as small as $75) to the poor to help them finance self-employment activities.  
See Pulley, 1989; Adams and von Pischke, 1992; Christen et al., 1995; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Jain, 1996; 
Coleman, 1999; Morduch, 1999; Wydick, 1999; Coleman, 2002; Matin, Hulme, and Rutherford, 2002; 
Anderson, Baland, and Moene, 2003; Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti, 2003, to name just a few.  Theoretical 
underpinnings of this literature can be found in Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Besley, Coate, and Loury, 
1993; Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghosh and Ray, 1996; Ghatak, 1999; Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 
2004.   3
lending theory (more on this in the next section).  Mortgages, on the other hand, have 
traditionally not been viewed as relationship loans (Stein, 2002, p. 1892).  Despite the 
heavy use of credit-score based models in mortgage originations, there still seems to be a 
special group of borrowers in low-income neighborhoods who need the assistance of a 
lender willing to invest in the collection of soft information; they constitute an 
interesting laboratory where the implications of relationship lending can be tested. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section explains 
how relationships ease informational frictions and presents the hypotheses tested in 
later sections.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 explains the method.  Section 5 
presents the results.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
The claim that branch presence in low-income neighborhoods makes credit more 
accessible to the poor builds on the relationship-lending theory (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 
1992; von Thadden, 2002).  As Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown, the lack of 
information about a borrower’s credit quality leads to credit rationing due to adverse 
selection.  The market response to potential credit rationing has been credit-scoring and 
relationship lending.  Credit scoring allows lenders to judge the riskiness of a borrower 
based on incomplete information about the borrower, so long as a particular subset of 
borrower characteristics can be observed at a relatively low cost.  Relationship lending, 
on the other hand,  relies on soft information about borrowers that is observed through a 
lender’s interactions with the borrower through time.  The strength of the relationship 
will be a function of time and the diversity of these interactions (Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000).  A bank’s advantage in relationship lending is that it 
can interact with a borrower on both sides of the balance sheet -- through lending and 
deposit products -- and in such an environment, it can learn about the borrower’s 
quality over time.  While relationship development is a costly process, the bank can 
recoup its initial investment by exploiting its private information as the borrower 
graduates into more profitable product lines (Berger and Udell, 1996).  Competitors 
know that attempts to lure away customers from the relationship lender subject them to   4
a lemons problem, as the relationship bank will undercut them in the pricing of credit 
only in those cases where it is profitable to do so (Sharpe 1990). 
The types of information that relationship lending depends on can only be 
reliably collected and processed at a local level.  In other words, relationship lending 
requires a physical presence in the market.  In this setting, the distance between the 
lender and borrower is important because proximity lowers the cost of collecting soft 
information (e.g., extra communication costs).  As a result, loan applicants close to their 
lenders are more likely to be approved and less likely to default (Petersen and Rajan, 
2002; Brevoort and Hannan, 2004; DeYoung et al 2006). 
The relationship theory has never been applied to consumer lending.  The focus 
has been instead on small business loans. The choice of small businesses as a focal point 
is, to some extent, a consequence of the time period when this literature flourished.  One 
major policy concern in the early 1990s was whether small businesses would starve for 
credit as small banks disappeared as a result of the merger wave of 1990s.  In response, 
the U.S. Justice Department reviewed the antitrust implications of bank-merger 
applications under the assertion that local small business loan markets must be 
preserved and a physical presence in a market is necessary to adequately serve that 
market.  It viewed the lack of physical facilities as prima facie evidence a bank is not 
serving a community.  The concern was rooted in the long-held belief that small banks 
are crucial in lending to small businesses because these banks specialize in character 
loans rather than (or in addition to) arm’s-length loans.3 
Given the policy concerns of the time, it was perhaps only natural for economists 
to test the implications of relationship-lending theory within the context of small banks 
lending to small businesses (Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell, 1998; Peek and 
Rosengren, 1998, Strahan and Weston, 1998 to name a few).  The facts that emerged from 
these studies are less than an unqualified support for the theory.  Although the evidence 
supports the view that small banks specialize in lending to informationally “difficult” 
borrowers (Berger et al., 2005; Cole et al., 2004), small firms’ access to credit is not 
                                                           
3 Large banks and other non-bank intermediaries, however, specialize in cookie-cutter loans, which are 
approved or denied based on a computer model (a credit score) and leave little wiggle room to the   5
impaired in the long run when there are fewer small banks in the area.  Small firms in 
areas with few small banks are no more credit-constrained than firms in areas with 
many small banks (Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999). 
The reason for the ambiguous findings may be the way small business lending is 
measured.  First, a business owner with good personal credit can take a consumer loan 
and use it to finance his business.  This loan is not classified as a small business loan 
despite its final use.  When a small bank disappears, a consumer loan may substitute for 
a relationship loan and make it difficult to estimate the value of the bank-small business 
relationship.  Second, small businesses are not a homogenous group.  The U.S. Small 
Business Administration classifies an enterprise as a “small business” if its assets are less 
than a pre-specified amount or if it has fewer than a pre-specified number of employees-
--depending on the industry.  Under these guidelines, a mom-and-pop grocery store, a 
$28 million firm in highway construction or a 1,500-employee firm in aircraft research 
can all be considered small businesses.  Finally, if one thinks of a small business loan as a 
loan to a company that does not have access to the public bond market, then even loans 
as large as $100 million may fit the description of a “relationship” loan.  So, the 
ambiguity in the definition of a small business may be responsible for the 
conflicting/ambiguous results in the literature. 
One solution to these problems may be to step back and test the theory from a 
different perspective.  Mortgage loans in low-income areas are a good place to start.4  
The benefit of examining mortgage loans is that data aggregation problems are less of a 
concern.  The definition of a “low-income consumer” is less ambiguous than the 
definition of a small business.  Also, consumers do not substitute mortgages for other 
types of loan, a possible strategy with small business loans. 
By applying the tenets of relationship lending to consumer lending, I conjecture 
that lenders’ interactions with households in low and moderate income neighborhoods 
                                                                                                                                                                             
judgment of a loan officer.  Borrowers choose among a pre-determined set of contracts, and loan terms do 
not adjust to borrowers’ specific needs.  (Cole, Goldberg, and White, 2004) 
4 One would imagine that information-driven agency problems in lending markets would be more severe in 
local credit markets consisting of low and moderate income households.   6
provide them with an informational advantage over other lenders.5  These interactions 
take place through the delivery of services that are targeted to the poor, such as financial 
education and counseling services, “second-chance” checking and savings accounts, and 
low-cost alternatives to payday loans. A physical presence in the market is required to 
reach customers in these neighborhoods and glean information, such as how many 
checks a customer bounces every month, how many weeks the customer can go without 
using a payday loan or how often the customer has to renegotiate the repayment 
schedule.  As the bank gets to know its customers more intimately, those who show 
promise may graduate into higher-margin, more sophisticated services, such as 
mortgages and auto loans.  In other words, the bank gains from this relationship not 
necessarily through the repeat sales of the same product (as might be the case with 
small-business loans) but through the cross-selling of multiple products. 
2.1 Testable Hypotheses 
Consider a mortgage market comprised of borrowers with unobservable risk 
characteristics.  Borrowers’ expected return from their housing investment is such that, 
as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), loan demand declines at high interest rates as low-risk 
customers drop out of the market.  With the mix of the applicant pool worsening, the 
supply also declines at high interest rates because the expected return to the bank per 
dollar loaned goes down.  If the lender’s profit is maximized at an interest rate below the 
market-clearing rate, demand is greater than supply in equilibrium. 
The main hypothesis of the paper is based on the premise that reducing 
information barriers through relationship lending would mitigate the worsening of the 
applicant pool at high interest rates and enhance credit availability. 
Hypothesis 1: Access to credit, measured by the dollar amount of mortgages originated 
per household, will increase with greater access to bank branches, as measured by proximity to 
bank branches, in low-income neighborhoods. 
A related question is what happens to the price of credit in a market with 
increasing access to bank branches.  Earlier studies in the small-business loan market 
                                                           
5  Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (1998) show that tracking a firm’s checking account balances may 
provide the bank useful information for detecting problems early on.  Avery et al. (1999) find that banks   7
have found evidence supporting the predictions of the spatial-price-discrimination 
(SPD) models; i.e., the borrowing costs increase as the lender gets closer to the borrower 
but decline if there are other competing lenders nearby (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; 
Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006).  The intuition is that the lender’s proprietary information 
allows it to earn monopoly rents from its dealings with the borrower.  As the distance 
increases, the informational advantage wanes.  In other words, as the borrower gets 
farther and farther from the informed lender, the loan rates approach the competitive 
rate as the ability of the lender to collect the information and outcompete other lenders 
in the market disappears.  Furthermore, as the uninformed competing lenders get closer 
to the borrower, the competitive rate itself declines due to declining transportation costs 
(Lederer and Hurter, 1986; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). 
How well this theory applies to the mortgage market for low-income borrowers 
is not obvious.  There are at least two factors that set the low-income mortgage market 
apart.  The first factor applies to the mortgage market in general, the second is low-
income market specific. 
The first factor is that arm’s-length lending in the mortgage market does not 
depend on transportation costs.  Transportation costs capture the borrower’s difficulty 
in identifying the location and the loan-terms of the lenders in the area.  Arm’s-length 
mortgage market, however, is national.  Those mortgages can be originated by distant 
lenders who base their decisions on the downpayment amount and the credit score 
(Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006).  As a result, any potential borrower, 
irrespective of his income, can apply for a mortgage online or by responding to a mail 
offer.  Because the arm’s length mortgage market is national, the distance of uninformed 
lenders to the borrowers should be irrelevant to the mortgage rate. 
The second factor is that Stiglitz-Weiss style credit rationing is not a problem 
considered in the SPD-based small-business lending literature; all borrowers of all types 
get credit at some price.  In contrast, credit rationing is an important characteristic of the 
low-income mortgage market; uninformed lenders will never satisfy all the demand at 
any price. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
learn about the neighborhood they are in as they process more mortgage applications.    8
How do these factors affect the predictions on the SPD models?  First, unlike the 
arm’s-length market, relationship lending is local.  Therefore, I suppose that closer 
distance and increased number of bank branches have a detectable impact on the 
mortgage rates not necessarily because of higher competition by uninformed lenders but 
because closeness (lower transportation costs) provides a greater opportunity to form 
relationships.  Second, because of credit rationing by the uninformed lenders, the 
competitive threat to the monopoly rents of the informed lender could be much smaller 
than anticipated by the SPD models.  To the extent that the informed lender’s monopoly 
rents are not challenged ex post, we may observe an increase in interest rates (and a 
decline in quantity) with increasing distance to reflect the lender’s increasing risk due to 
deteriorating information quality. 
The second hypothesis of the paper captures this idea. 
Hypothesis 2: Price of credit will decline with greater access to bank branches in low-
income neighborhoods. 
3. Data Description 
I analyze the effect of branch presence on access to mortgages in Ohio’s low-
income neighborhoods.6  My definition of a neighborhood is a census tract.  Census 
tracts are designed by the Census Bureau to be relatively homogeneous units in terms of 
population (about 4,000 inhabitants), population characteristics, economic status, and 
living conditions.  All information related to census tract characteristics comes from the 
1990 and 2000 Decennial Census.  Information related to mortgages originated in a 
census tract comes from the 2004 HMDA Loan Application Register (LAR) data.  Branch 
addresses that I use to determine the branch location come from the FDIC’s Summary of 
Deposits file.  In the remainder of this section, I will describe these data in greater detail. 
3.1 Census Data 
As described in the next section, I use the changes in census tract characteristics 
from 1990 to 2000 in explaining the changes in the local banking market.  One 
complication is that census tract boundaries changed from the 1990 Census to the 2000   9
Census.  In 1990, there were 2,862 census tracts in Ohio; in 2000, there were 2,941 tracts.  
The change in boundaries comes in many forms.  Tracts split, tracts merge, and tracts 
split and merge with split-off sections of other tracts.  To control for changes in tract 
characteristics, I need tract boundaries that are stable from 1990 to 2000. 
To achieve stable boundaries, I use the strategy summarized in Figure 1.  Using 
the Census Bureau’s Census Tract Relationship Files, I merge the tracts that went 
through a boundary change until I cover the smallest area that has not changed its shape 
from 1990 to 2000.  For example, in Figure 1, Census-1990 tracts 1, 2, 3, and 4 merge to 
form the new tract 1, while the Census-2000 tracts 1 and 2 merge to create the same new 
tract 1 in 2000.  The characteristics of the new tract are obtained by combining the 
characteristics of the original tracts either by a simple addition (population, housing 
units, etc.) or a weighted average (median incomes weighted by population, median 
home values weighted by housing units, etc.).  The redrawing of boundaries leaves me 
with 2,062 new census tract-based markets,  1,665 of them are the same as the Census 
Bureau’s tracts; i.e., their shape remains constant from 1990 to 2000.  The remainder, 387 
areas, are an amalgamation of multiple tracts, of which 60 are an amalgamation of 4 
tracts or more.  A total of 39 census tracts are eliminated from the dataset because there 
is no resident population or no owner-occupied property (business districts, airports, 
etc.). 
After this clean-up, I divide my sample of 2,023 local markets into two groups by 
census tract median income.  HMDA classifies census tracts that are below the national 
median income as low-moderate income neighborhoods.  Since I work with Ohio 
neighborhoods, I use the median income in Ohio as the cutoff point.  By this standard, 
census tracts with median incomes below $40,956 are classified as low-moderate income 
census tracts (1,289 tracts).  Those with median incomes above $40,956 are in the middle-
high income category (734 tracts). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 I chose Ohio because the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Affairs Department granted me 
access to their geocoding software, which I used to locate bank branches; more on this later.   10
3.2 Branch Presence   
The FDIC’s Summary of Deposits file provides the branch addresses of every 
FDIC-insured institution in the country.  There were 3,886 bank branches in Ohio in 1999 
and 3,963 in 2004.  Using CRAWiz, a geocoding software package, each address is 
matched to a latitude and longitude.  About 92 percent of the addresses match 
automatically; because of spelling errors or incomplete addresses, the rest must be 
matched manually.  For those, I search for the correct address on the Internet and 
replace the old address with the new one in CRAWiz.  If that fails, there are a few other 
alternatives.  If the address is an intersection, I can point to the intersection on the 
CRAWiz map, and the software will use the latitude and longitude of that point.  If there 
is ambiguity about the directional qualifier (e.g., North vs. South Main Street), I use 
Google satellite pictures to determine where the branch is located; for example, if 123 
North Main Street is a residence and 123 South Main Street is a business building, the 
branch is in the business building.  Using this method, I determine the location of every 
FDIC-insured institution branch in the state. 
To obtain a measure of branch presence in a census tract, I determine the 
distance of each branch to the census tract centroid using the Haversine Formula 
(Sinnott, 1984).7  Then, I take all the branches within 10 miles of the centroid and 














∑   (1) 
where BAccessi is the branch access variable for census tract i, and nb is the number of 
branches within 10-mile radius of the centroid of census tract i.  Di,k is the distance of 
branch k to the centroid of census tract i.  In accordance with the relationship literature, 
this construction assumes that the farther the branch is from the centroid, the less likely 
it is to improve the accessibility of banking services in the census tract. 
                                                           
7 The centroid is conceptually similar to the center of gravity of a 3-D object, except that it applies to a two 
dimensional shape.   11
Four important issues about this variable are worth mentioning.  First, this 
measure is better than counting only the branches inside a census tract because in urban 
areas, one could miss a branch across a street if the tract boundary is the street.  
Including all branches within a certain distance to the tract solves this problem.  Second, 
the implicit assumption is that branches farther than 10 miles have no effect on branch 
access.  I will address this issue in robustness checks by reducing and increasing this 
radius.  Third, measuring the distance of the branch to the tract centroid will be 
misleading in rural areas where the census tracts are very large and populated areas are 
in a little corner of the tract (e.g., Southeast Ohio).  So the inverse distance of the branch 
to the centroid will underestimate the level of branch access in areas where the centroid 
is in an uninhabited area.  I will address this issue in robustness checks by discarding 
sparsely populated areas.  Fourth, if the branch is located exactly over the census tract 
centroid, BAccess will go to infinity.  In my sample, there are very few branches that are 
closer than 1 mile to the centroid and none of them is closer than 0.02 miles.  But, one 
could conceivably get extremely large BAccess values.  I investigate this issue further in 
















∑   (1’) 
which treats branches that are closer than 1-mile as if they were at exactly 1-mile.  
3.3 HMDA 
Under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, depository and non-
depository financial institutions report all mortgage applications they receive in each 
census tract by disclosing the loan applicant’s income, race, gender, and the loan’s 
amount, whether it is FHA or VA-insured, whether it was kept on the originator’s 
balance sheet or sold, the originator’s identification number, whether the application 
was approved or denied and if it is denied, the reason for denial, and starting for the 
first time with the 2004 data (reported in 2005), the spread of the loan price over the rate 
of a Treasury security of comparable maturity at the time of origination if the spread   12
exceeds 3%.8  The loan price includes the interest rate as well as points, fees and 
premiums for private mortgage insurance. 
I exclude refinancings and mortgages to purchase renter-occupied property from 
the analysis.  I also exclude the data on mortgages purchased by financial institutions 
that were originated at an earlier time.  This prevents double-counting, once at 
origination and once at the time of sale.  After this clean-up, I am left with 246,327 
mortgage originations (>$17.3 billion) in 2000, 91,517 of them (>$6.4 billion) in low-
income neighborhoods and 266,516 home mortgages (>$22.9 billion) in 2004, 100,666 of 
them (>$8.7 billion) in low-income neighborhoods. 
HMDA presents many data challenges.  There are a few pieces of information 
one would like to have about these loans but is left wanting.  The maturity and the loan-
to-value ratio of the mortgage are unknown, the borrower’s credit score and 
downpayment amount are unknown, as are other important terms of the loan such as 
whether the loan has a fixed or adjustable rate or whether it is a full or no-doc loan.  
Finally, because the loan price is reported only if its spread is 3 percentage points above 
the Treasury rate, some mortgages are reported with a zero interest rate; 69 census tracts 
have no price reported (45 of them low-moderate income) because all spreads are below 
3%.9 
Some of the problems of HMDA, such as the missing maturity and loan-to-value 
ratio, cannot be fixed.  However, their impact will be limited in low-income 
communities.  While affordable housing programs targeted to low-income 
neighborhoods, such as the Fannie Mae Community Home Buyer Program, Fannie 97 
and FHA-insured mortgages, allow 15- or 30-year mortgages, it is safe to assume that 
cash-strapped individuals will be more inclined to take the 30-year mortgage (lower 
monthly payments make it easier to qualify for a 30-year mortgage than a shorter-term 
mortgage).  Whether the mortgage has a fixed or adjustable rate may be unknown but 
this is again less of a problem in low-income areas relative to high-income areas because 
                                                           
8 There are some exemptions to reporting requirements based on an institution’s asset size or the size of its 
mortgage lending business.  However, the reporting threshold is low enough that HMDA represents an 
accurate picture of the local lending market. 
9 It may seem surprising at first that there are more low-income census tracts with all spreads less than 3% 
than high-income census tracts.  This is because almost two-thirds of Ohio’s census tracts are low-income.   13
affordable housing programs require a fixed-rate mortgage.  The missing downpayment 
data is also not too problematic because downpayment requirements in low-income 
areas are very low, varying between 0% and 5% (3% for FHA loans). 
Finally, the price data can be improved upon.  In order to estimate the local 
mortgage interest rate, I fit a lognormal distribution over the reported spread data in 
each census tract, assuming that the distribution is left-censored at 3%.  I accomplish this 
by estimating a censored regression model including only an intercept on the right-hand 
side.  The intercept is the mean of the uncensored distribution, which I use in the 
analysis. 
4. Method 
The quantity and price of loans in a local market must be simultaneously 
determined.  I estimate the impact of bank branch presence in 1999, BAccess99, on 
mortgage originations---the dollar amount of mortgage originations per household in 
2004, Originate04---and spreads, Spread04, by estimating the following system with 
GMM (to preclude heteroscedasticity problems) in low-income census tracts: 
Originate04 = f (BAccess99, Spread04, Retired00, X1) + εO 
Spread04 =  f  (BAccess99, Originate04, LenderCost00, X1) + εS (2) 
Identification is clearly an issue.  I identify the price, Spread04, by the share of 
retired individuals in the census tract population, Retired00.  Retired households in a 
low-income neighborhood are unlikely to be significant participants in the home-
purchase market.  In the Census data, Retired00 also captures the population in 
retirement communities, who do not use mortgages.  Because this population is at best a 
tiny portion of the market, the spreads on the loans originated should not depend on its  
share in the total population; however, originations should decline with its increased 
presence. 
I identify the quantity of the loans originated, Originate04, by the cost of interest-
bearing liabilities (interest expense to interest-bearing liabilities) of the highest-cost bank 
in the market, LenderCost00.10  I assume that the mortgage rates in the market are 
                                                           
10 Using the average interest cost of all lenders does not affect the results.   14
sufficiently high to make the highest-cost lender viable.  Therefore, mortgage spreads 
should be positively correlated with LenderCost00.  Originations---or mortgage demand--
-will depend on banks’ cost structure indirectly, only to the extent that the costs affect 
the spread. 
The system also contains a rich set of control variables, denoted by X1, which 
comprises of demographic, mortgage-market-specific, and banking-market-specific 
factors. 
4.1 Demographic Factors 
ChildInFamily00 is the share of children in the census tract who live in a two-
parent household.  Because single-parent households may be more cash-constrained, 
ChildInFamily00 may be positively associated with originations and negatively 
associated with spreads. 
HighSchool00 is the share of the population over 25 years of age whose 
educational achievement is a high school diploma or less.  HighSchool00 may be 
negatively associated with originations and positively associated with spreads because 
educational achievement can be an indicator of job opportunities. 
Income90 and Income00 are the natural log of the median income in the census 
tract in 1990 and 2000, respectively. 
Jobs00 is the employment rate in the census tract. 
Manufacturing00 is the share of manufacturing jobs in total jobs in the census 
tract in 2000.  This variable captures the effect of the employer mix on the availability of 
mortgages under the assumption that manufacturing jobs could be correlated with the 
perceived stability of employment in the area. 
Population90 and Population00 are the natural log of the population of the census 
tract in 1990 and 2000. 
Race00 is the share of the African-American population in the total population. 
RuralPop00 is the share of the population that is classified as rural by the Census 
Bureau.  Population turnover may be slower in rural areas, which may impact   15
originations.  Spreads may be higher in these areas because of the dependence of the 
local economies on farming, a volatile sector of the economy. 
ShortCommute00 is the share of the employed population that works at home or 
commutes less than 30 minutes to work.  ShortCommute00 is a measure of access to 
alternative banking markets.  Its effect on access to mortgages can go either way.  On 
one hand, access to financial services in distant banking markets may increase 
competition in the local market.  As monopoly rents disappear, mortgages may become 
available at greater quantity and lower cost.  On the other hand, more competition in the 
home market may weaken relationships and have a negative impact on mortgage 
availability in low-income neighborhoods (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). 
4.2 Mortgage-Market-Specific Factors 
Applications00 is the number of mortgage applications per owner-occupied 
housing units.  It is a proxy for population turnover in the area.  If an exogenous factor 
that I am not explicitly controlling for is creating demand for mortgages, its effect will be 
captured in Applications00. 
BankShare00 is the share of banks in mortgage originations in the census tract.  
This variable controls for the presence of institutions that are not insured by the FDIC 
(credit unions and non-bank mortgage lenders). 
BorrowerIncome00 is the natural log of the average income of mortgage applicants 
who were approved for a mortgage.  Note that mortgage terms are likely to depend both 
on neighborhood characteristics and borrower characteristics.  While BorrowerIncome00 
captures the borrower characteristics, Income90 and Income00 capture the neighborhood 
characteristics. 
CoApplicant00 is a share of loan applications with a co-applicant. 
Conventional00 is the share of mortgages that have been originated with at least 
25% equity and without any government insurance. 
CreditProblem00 is the share of mortgage applicants denied credit because of poor 
credit histories in 2000.  Even though I do not have any information on the credit quality 
of each borrower, I use CreditProblem00 as a proxy for credit risk at local market level.   16
FHA00 is the share of mortgages that are insured by the FHA. 
HomeValue90 and HomeValue00 are the natural log of the median house price in 
the census tract in 1990 and 2000. 
Institutions00 is the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that 
originated mortgages in the census tracts, including all depositories, and non-bank 
lenders. 
Originate00 is the initial value of Originate04 in 2000. 
OOHousing00 is the share of owner-occupied housing in the total housing stock; 
the more owner-occupied housing there is, the greater the originations will be. 
UnsoldLoan00 is the share of mortgages originated but not sold (kept on the 
balance sheet of the originator).  If these mortgages are not sold because the verifiable 
information about the borrowers are unacceptable to buyers who base their decisions on 
heuristics, then UnsoldLoan00 is a measure of the market’s opacity. 
4.3 Banking-Market-Specific Factors 
Deposits99 is total deposits in bank branches within 10 miles of the census tract 
centroid, weighted by the inverse of their distance to the centroid per household, per 
dollar of income.  Deposits99 captures the savings rate and the level of financial 
development in the census tract.  Keeping all other factors constant, higher values of 
Deposits99 indicate that bank branches are able to extract greater personal savings from 
each dollar of income.  Given my main argument that distance to a lender affects the 
effectiveness of bank-customer relations, I reduce the impact of financial development 
on lending with increasing distance of the branch. 
Efficiency00 is the average X-efficiency of the banks present in the market in the 
1997-2000 period, calculated using the alternative profit efficiency approach and Fourier-
flexible functional form.  I prefer the alternative profit efficiency approach over the 
standard profit efficiency because it provides a way of controlling for unmeasured 
differences in output quality and market power---which is what information-intensive 
lending is about.  Because the steps involved in calculating the X-efficiency are 
complicated, I omit that discussion here but refer the reader to Berger and Mester (1997).   17
Herfindahl00 is the deposit-market Herfindahl index, where the local market is 
defined as the area within 20 miles of a census tract centroid.  Using a 5- or 10-mile 
radius does not affect the results. 
4.4 Sample Selection Issues 
The last component of X1 is  ˆ λ , the Mill’s Ratio estimated from the following 
probit model.  It takes into account the effect of the 45 census tracts omitted from the 
low-income sample due to the lack of spread data.  The regression is once again run 







ee X β  (3) 
where the Event is having the census-tract-level spread reported as zero (all individual 
spreads less than 3%).  Xe includes an intercept term and Income00, FHA00, Herfindahl00, 
HighSchool00, HomeValue00, MarketProfit99, ShortCommute00, BAccess99,  and Race00.  The 
assumption is that spreads may be low in a market if incomes are high, some loans are 
FHA-insured, the market is not concentrated, the share of uneducated population is low, 
collateral values are high, the probability of entry (captured by the profitability of the 
market MarketProfit99) is high, and customers have access to distant banking markets.  I 
also include the racial mix of the community and the level of access to banking services 
in 1999 as control variables.  MarketProfit99 is the profitability of the banking market in 
and around the census tract as described in Appendix A. 
For the sake of brevity, I do not present these results but I calculate the Mill’s 
Ratio as  () ˆˆ ˆ () 1 ()
ee ee XX λφ β β =− Φ  for each census tract. 
The descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are presented in 
Table 1.  A comparison of sample averages indicates that low-income neighborhoods, 
compared to middle-high income neighborhoods, have more African-American 
residents, fewer children who live in a two-parent household, and fewer owner-
occupied housing units.  Financial institutions are more likely to carry these recently 
originated loans on their balance sheets (UnsoldLoan00 in Table 1 Panel B and C), which 
suggests greater borrower opacity.  Also note that the branch access variable (BAccess) is   18
greater in low-income neighborhoods compared to higher-income census tracts.  This is 
because high-income neighborhoods are mostly in the suburbs and low-income 
neighborhoods are closer to urban, business districts with many bank branches. 
The model in (2) assumes that branch presence has a lagging effect on mortgage 
availability.  However, there may also be a concurrent effect.  Therefore, I repeat the 
analysis, replacing BAccess99 and Deposits99 with BAccess04 and Deposits04 and initially 
treating the latter two as exogenous.  However, given the strong potential for 
endogeneity, I also estimate the following system with GMM: 
Originate04 = f (BAccess04, Spread04, Deposits04, Retired00, CreditProblem00, OOHousing00, 
X2) + εO 
Spread04 =  f  (BAccess04, Originate04, Deposits04, LenderCost00, CreditProblem00, 
OOHousing00, X2) + εS (4) 
BAccess04 =  f  (BAccess99, Deposits99, Retired00, LenderCost00, OOHousing00, X3) + ε B 
Deposits04 =  f  (BAccess99, Deposits99, Retired00, LenderCost00, CreditProblem00, X3) + ε D 
Table 2 lists all the variables on the right-hand side of the equations in (4) to 
make it easier to track which variable belongs to which equation.  BAccess04 is identified 
by the assumption that the bank’s entry decision will not be affected by the mortgage 
borrowers’ observable past credit histories (CreditProblem00).  Note that the sample 
includes only low-income neighborhoods.  In this environment, credit information either 
indicates a low credit quality or is unavailable for a particular class of borrowers 
(Stegman, Quercia, and Lobenhofer, 2001).  Therefore, I assume that while credit quality 
may affect the branching decision between high-income and low-income 
neighborhoods, it will have no impact conditional on all the potential markets being 
low-income.  For identification, I also assume that CreditProblem00 is negatively 
correlated with Deposits04 because in markets where credit histories are poor, savings 
rate will also be low---otherwise, people would have paid their debt.  Deposits04 is 
identified with the assumption that the share of owner-occupied housing units in the 
neighborhood’s total housing stock, OOHousing00, is uncorrelated with the savings rate 
(deposits per dollar of income) of the population in 2004.   19
Once again, I have a long list of control variables. X2 contains all the variables in 
X1 except Deposits99, CreditProblem00, and OOHousing00, which are still in the analysis 
but I show them explicitly in (4) instead of hiding them in X1. 
X3 contains all the variables in X2 and a measure of market profitability in 1994 
and 1999 (MarketProfit94 and MarketProfit99), which may affect banks’ entry decisions.11  
I also include the 1990 values of some of my control variables, HighSchool90 and 
Manufacturing90 under the assumption that the entry decisions are based on long-term 
trends in the population’s job opportunities and the employer mix of the area. 
5. Results 
Table 3 presents the results from the system in (2).  At the bottom of the Table 
(and all other Tables that will follow), I present the R-square measure proposed by 
Windmeijer (1995), which is the squared-correlation of the observed and predicted 
dependent variables.  In low-income areas, greater access to bank branches is associated 
with improved access to mortgages in 2004, as measured by higher quantity 
(Originate04) and lower cost (Spread04).  One standard-deviation-increase in BAccess99 is 
associated with a $499 increase in mortgage originations per household (the sample 
mean is $3,000) and a 30–basis-point decline in spreads.  An interesting observation is 
that the number of institutions in the market (Institutions00, which includes both bank 
and non-bank lenders) is irrelevant.  This finding suggests that it does not matter 
whether all branches belong to a single bank or whether each branch is an independent 
entity.  I also find that the presence of other types of lenders does not have any 
statistically significant impact on mortgage availability (BankShare00). 
Glancing over the other variables, I do not find any sign of discrimination based 
on race.  In fact, the opposite is true.  Mortgage availability seems to be higher in 
minority neighborhoods (Race00); originations increase and spreads decline with 
increasing African-American population.  However, if I remove the educational 
attainment (HighSchool00) and the impact of single parents (ChildInFamily00) from the 
analysis (results not shown), the positive correlation between Race00 and originations 
                                                           
11 The initial value of market profitability is from 1994 because that is the earliest year for which the FDIC 
reports the Summary of Deposits on its website.   20
disappears.  More importantly, the correlation between Race00 and spreads becomes 
significantly positive.  This finding suggests that without proper controls, one could 
mistakenly observe that minorities are discriminated against in the mortgage market.  
The average efficiency of the institutions in the market seems to be positively correlated 
with originations and negatively correlated with spreads but these effects are not 
statistically significant.  As I mentioned earlier, the ability to access distant banking 
markets (ShortCommute00 measures lack of access) may have either a positive effect on 
mortgage availability due to disappearing monopoly rents in the local market, or a 
negative effect because of weakening relationships under increased competition.  My 
analysis suggests that the latter effect dominates.  As people work closer to home (high 
ShortCommute00), mortgage originations tend to increase and spreads tend to decrease.  
This is a strong support for the relationship-lending theory.  Finally, I find that tract 
residents’ educational attainment has a significant impact on mortgage availability.  I 
interpret education attainment as a proxy for the accessibility of gainful and stable jobs.  
As educational attainment deteriorates (high HighSchool00) across census tracts, 
mortgage originations drop and spreads increase.  
Table 4 repeats the analysis but this time using the contemporaneous branch 
access variable BAccess04.  The conclusions are the same but the economic effect of 
branch access is stronger.  This time, one standard deviation increase in BAccess04 is 
associated with a $637 increase in originations per household and a 39 basis point drop 
in spreads.  However, this analysis does not account for the endogeneity of the 
branching decision.  Therefore, in Table 5, I endogenize branch access and financial 
development as measured by Deposits04 using the system in (4).  The results are very 
strong.  A one–standard-deviation increase in branch access is associated with a $868 
increase in originations per household and a 56–basis-point drop in spreads.  The 
increase of $868 corresponds to a 29% increase in originations relative to sample mean of 
Originate04.  Also note from Table 1 that the average spread over Treasuries in the 
sample is 1.9%.  The decline in spreads by 56 bp is a 29% drop from the sample mean.  
These findings support the first and second hypotheses of the paper.   21
5.1 Robustness Checks 
I have so far tested the implications of the relationship lending theory by 
investigating whether those who are most likely to benefit from relationships actually do 
so.  An alternative way of looking at this problem is to investigate which group of 
individuals would benefit less from relationships in the mortgage market.  Anticipating 
that information-driven problems will be less severe in high-income areas, it is safe to 
assume that mortgage lending in these areas will depend mostly on credit scoring, not 
relationships.  If I find that branch presence is important for mortgage availability in 
both low- and high-income neighborhoods, I can no longer make the argument that 
what drives the importance of branches is relationship lending. To test this hypothesis, I 
estimate system (4) in high-income census tracts.  The results are in Table 6, Panel A.  As 
expected, access to a bank branch has no significant impact on originations and spreads 
in high-income areas. 
By design, BAccess assumes that the impact of a branch on credit availability 
declines with its distance to the market.  If this assumption is correct, disregarding the 
distance and simply counting the bank branches in and around a neighborhood should 
weaken the results statistically and economically.  Weaker results would indicate that 
the distance of the lender is important and that relationships do exist.  
I will demonstrate the importance of distance in two ways.  First, I will ignore the 
distance of the branch to the census tract centroid.  In other words, if I find a branch 
within ten miles of the centroid, I will increase the access variable by one irrespective of 
the distance.  Second, I will still use the 1/Distance ratio in calculating the access 
variable but I will decrease the radius of my search to five miles and then repeat the 
analysis after increasing it to 20 miles.  If the 10-mile radius is the correct distance to 
consider for viable relationships, adding more distant branches to the calculation should 
increase the noise in the measure and weaken my results.  
The results are in Table 6 Panels B and C.  Panel B shows that, as expected, the 
economic effect of BAccess04 weakens when I increase the radius to 20 miles.  The effect 
also weakens when I decrease the radius to five miles, but the decline is much smaller.  
Panel C shows that if I ignore the distance completely and just add up the branches, the   22
conclusions may be misleading.  According to Panel C (using the 10-mile radius results), 
an increase in the local number of branches from zero to one, 10 miles from the centroid, 
increases originations per household by $9,165.  However, if we account for the distance 
of the branch, the actual increase in the branch-access variable is 0.1 (1/10).  According 
to Table 5, the effect of such an increase is a more modest $4,177.  Conversely, if the new 
branch is only 1 mile from the centroid, Panel C of Table 6 would still forecast an 
increase in originations by $9,165.  However, at such a close distance, Table 5 suggests 
that the increase is $30,380.  But which one is the correct prediction?  The one that 
includes the distance or the one that ignores it?  To answer this question, I estimate the 
following system: 
Originate04 = f (BAccess04, BAccess04id, Spread04, Deposits04, Retired00, CreditProblem00, 
OOHousing00, X2) + εO 
Spread04 =  f  (BAccess04, BAccess04id, Originate04, Deposits04, LenderCost00, 
CreditProblem00, OOHousing00, X2) + εS (5) 
BAccess04 =  f  (BAccess99, Deposits99, Retired00, LenderCost00, OOHousing00, X3) + ε B 
BAccess04id = f (BAccess99id, Deposits99, Retired00, LenderCost00, OOHousing00, X3) + ε Bd 
Deposits04 =  f  (BAccess99, Deposits99, Retired00, LenderCost00, CreditProblem00, X3) + ε D 
where BAccess04id is the natural log of one plus the number of bank branches within 10 
miles of the census tract centroid, irrespective of their distance.  I include both 
BAccess04id and BAccess04 in the origination and spread equations to find out which one 
will survive.  The results are in Table 6, Panel D.  BAccess04 is the significant variable.  
These findings suggest that ignoring the distance between a neighborhood and lenders 
may lead to overestimating the impact of a distant branch and underestimating the 
impact of a branch nearby. 
To investigate whether my results are impacted by outliers, I repeat the analysis 
in two different ways.  First, I re-run regression (4) after winsorizing BAccess04, 
Originate04, and Spread04 at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the impact of potential 
outliers.12  Second, I redefine BAccess04 as in (1’).  The results are in Table 6 Panel E.  
While the results are somewhat weaker, the main conclusions stand.  
                                                           
12 Any observation that is below the 1
st percentile or above the 99
th percentile of the sample is reset to the 
1
st percentile and 99
th percentile values.   23
Next, I run my final robustness check.  As I mentioned earlier, I may be making a 
mistake in calculating BAccess in rural areas with large census tracts and small 
population centers.  To reduce the impact of mismeasured BAccess, I rank all my low-
income census tracts by declining population density and remove the lowest quartile 
from the sample.  The results from this smaller sample are in Table 6 Panel F.  There is 
no material difference between these results and the results in Table 5. 
6. Conclusion 
Relationship-lending literature has shown that bank-borrower interactions that 
reveal private information about the borrower to the lender are important in improving 
small businesses’ access to credit.  In this paper, I apply the same theory to lending in 
low-income neighborhoods.  I hypothesize that the presence of a bank branch in a low-
income community will improve the access to mortgage loans in the area by reducing 
the distance-related frictions in the information gathering process.  Thus, I investigate 
the connection between a branch access measure that I develop and mortgage 
originations and spreads.  I find a strong positive relationship between branch access 
and originations and a strong negative relationship between branch access and spreads. 
While several problems associated with HMDA data necessitates caution while 
interpreting the results, my findings still suggest that the usefulness of bank-borrower 
relationships is not limited to the small business lending market, where the focus of the 
literature has been. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A.  All Observations (N=2023) 
 
    Mean Std Dev Median Minimum  Maximum 
Endogenous Variables    
 BAccess04  0.0139 0.0240 0.0083 0.0000  0.5800 
 Deposits04  2.6796 1.6903 2.5216 0.0000  14.7325 
 Originate04  4.2723 4.4293 3.1008 0.0000  56.5091 
 Spread04  1.5795 0.9058 1.4541 0.0000  6.3700 
      
Demographic Factors    
 ChildInFamily00  0.4816 0.1301 0.5242 0.0253  0.6931 
 HighSchool00  0.1718 0.0873 0.1587 0.0000  0.5653 
 HighSchool90  0.2278 0.0997 0.2191 0.0000  0.6317 
 Income00  3.4030 0.7437 3.5633 -6.9078  5.2983 
 Income90  3.2784 0.6783 3.4457 -1.9661  5.0349 
 Jobs00  0.3785 0.0564 0.3929 0.0494  0.5692 
 Manufacturing00  0.1856 0.0689 0.1807 0.0000  0.4502 
 Manufacturing90  0.2227 0.0747 0.2205 0.0115  0.4869 
 Population00  0.1271 1.7112 0.5946 -4.4896  3.0609 
 Population90  0.1123 1.7677 0.5757 -4.1879  3.6009 
 Race00  0.1329 0.2015 0.0300 0.0000  0.6904 
 Retired00  0.1737 0.0500 0.1741 0.0000  0.3665 
 RuralPop00  0.2259 0.3653 0.0000 0.0000  1.0000 
 ShortCommute00  0.5434 0.0647 0.5552 0.0648  0.6931 
Mortgage-Market-Specific Factors   
 Applications00  0.0801 0.0572 0.0721 0.0000  1.6667 
 BankShare00  0.6691 0.1394 0.6824 0.0000  1.0000 
 BorrowerIncome00  3.8646 0.3287 3.8131 2.7726  5.7666 
 CoApplicant00  0.5002 0.1637 0.5255 0.0000  1.0000 
 Conventional00  0.0007 0.0036 0.0002 0.0000  0.0953 
 CreditProblem00  0.0748 0.0608 0.0612 0.0000  0.5000 
 FHA00  0.1414 0.1235 0.1059 0.0000  0.7082 
 HomeValue00  3.7205 1.1558 3.9228 -4.4804  9.2904 
 HomeValue90  3.4967 1.1286 3.6746 -4.1073  9.2434 
 Institutions00  3.5773 0.5707 3.6109 0.0000  5.4638 
 OOHousing00  0.7190 0.1973 0.7672 0.0039  1.0714 
 Originate00  3.2923 3.1260 2.4375 0.0000  37.2477 
 UnsoldLoan00  0.6216 0.1477 0.6190 0.0000  1.0000 
Banking-Market-Specific Factors    
 BAccess99  0.0207 0.0344 0.0095 0.0000  0.5401 
 Deposits99  2.6907 1.7612 2.5156 0.0000  14.8561 
 Efficiency00  0.7160 0.0636 0.7149 0.4832  0.9242 
 Herfindahl00  0.1371 0.0396 0.1392 0.0599  0.3909 
 LenderCost99  0.0503 0.0121 0.0459 0.0345  0.0865 
 MarketProfit94  0.0350 0.0103 0.0354 0.0087  0.0663 
 MarketProfit99  0.0466 0.0138 0.0466 0.0080  0.0934   31
 Panel B.  Low-Income Neighborhoods excluding zero-spread census tracts (N=1244) 
 
    Mean Std Dev Median Minimum  Maximum 
Endogenous Variables    
 BAccess04  0.0136 0.0198 0.0084 0.0000  0.2809 
 Deposits04  2.9985 1.7564 2.8644 0.0232  14.7325 
 Originate04  ($000)  2.9916 3.0859 2.1638 0.0000  35.1524 
 Spread04  (%)  1.9058 0.8970 1.7864 0.0113  6.3700 
      
Demographic Factors    
 ChildInFamily00  0.4353 0.1288 0.4703 0.0253  0.6748 
 HighSchool00  0.2048 0.0829 0.1944 0.0267  0.5653 
 HighSchool90  0.2627 0.0931 0.2577 0.0251  0.5919 
 Income00  3.0986 0.7674 3.3072 -6.9078  3.7124 
 Income90  2.9930 0.6647 3.1783 -1.9661  4.2408 
 Jobs00  0.3640 0.0568 0.3734 0.1220  0.5692 
 Manufacturing00  0.1875 0.0672 0.1844 0.0150  0.4502 
 Manufacturing90  0.2216 0.0745 0.2191 0.0351  0.4869 
 Population00  0.3991 1.6550 0.9073 -4.2134  3.0609 
 Population90  0.4122 1.7121 0.9299 -4.1879  3.6009 
 Race00  0.1758 0.2221 0.0624 0.0003  0.6904 
 Retired00  0.1688 0.0480 0.1710 0.0000  0.3606 
 RuralPop00  0.1645 0.3110 0.0000 0.0000  1.0000 
 ShortCommute00  0.5471 0.0625 0.5595 0.0648  0.6686 
Mortgage-Market-Specific Factors   
 Applications00  0.0806 0.0386 0.0741 0.0090  0.6265 
 BankShare00  0.6417 0.1398 0.6502 0.0000  1.0000 
 BorrowerIncome00  3.7501 0.2735 3.7035 2.7726  5.2661 
 CoApplicant00  0.4494 0.1576 0.4700 0.0000  0.8065 
 Conventional00  0.0007 0.0032 0.0003 0.0000  0.0953 
 CreditProblem00  0.0898 0.0629 0.0769 0.0000  0.5000 
 FHA00  0.1567 0.1270 0.1283 0.0000  0.6213 
 HomeValue00  3.3059 1.2173 3.6714 -4.4804  6.1193 
 HomeValue90  3.0600 1.1422 3.3806 -4.1073  5.3583 
 Institutions00  3.6144 0.5612 3.6109 1.0986  5.4638 
 OOHousing00  0.6584 0.1881 0.6883 0.0348  0.9935 
 Originate00  2.2961 2.0691 1.7671 0.0000  20.8177 
 UnsoldLoan00  0.6541 0.1416 0.6667 0.2857  1.0000 
Banking-Market-Specific Factors    
 BAccess99  0.0211 0.0351 0.0100 0.0000  0.5401 
 Deposits99  3.0007 1.8209 2.8488 0.0240  14.8561 
 Efficiency00  0.7195 0.0653 0.7226 0.4832  0.9242 
 Herfindahl00  0.1383 0.0412 0.1407 0.0614  0.3909 
 LenderCost99  0.0501 0.0120 0.0459 0.0345  0.0865 
 MarketProfit94  0.0355 0.0105 0.0363 0.0090  0.0663 
 MarketProfit99  0.0471 0.0136 0.0466 0.0080  0.0934 
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Panel C.  Middle-High Income Neighborhoods excluding zero-spread census tracts (N=710) 
 
    Mean Std Dev Median Minimum  Maximum 
Endogenous Variables    
 BAccess04  0.0099 0.0089 0.0078 0.0001  0.0590 
 Deposits04  1.9492 1.1132 1.8862 0.0434  6.5250 
 Originate04  ($000)  6.5981 5.3507 5.0536 0.5135  56.5091 
 Spread04  (%)  1.1605 0.5699 1.1199 0.0119  4.9182 
      
Demographic Factors    
 ChildInFamily00  0.5699 0.0541 0.5758 0.2621  0.6830 
 HighSchool00  0.1116 0.0469 0.1143 0.0040  0.2719 
 HighSchool90  0.1634 0.0629 0.1688 0.0142  0.3461 
 Income00  3.9405 0.1996 3.8831 3.7126  5.0808 
 Income90  3.7902 0.2567 3.7530 0.4935  4.9558 
 Jobs00  0.4086 0.0281 0.4088 0.1604  0.4934 
 Manufacturing00  0.1873 0.0695 0.1794 0.0327  0.3883 
 Manufacturing90  0.2300 0.0722 0.2277 0.0509  0.4290 
 Population00  -0.3895 1.6824 -0.1396 -3.9542  2.6326 
 Population90  -0.4641 1.7236 -0.2929 -3.8991  2.6512 
 Race00  0.0479 0.1070 0.0105 0.0003  0.6751 
 Retired00  0.1852 0.0469 0.1809 0.0000  0.3665 
 RuralPop00  0.3380 0.4222 0.0367 0.0000  1.0000 
 ShortCommute00  0.5375 0.0628 0.5454 0.3193  0.6666 
Mortgage-Market-Specific Factors   
 Applications00  0.0742 0.0360 0.0691 0.0113  0.5000 
 BankShare00  0.7106 0.1161 0.7235 0.2274  0.9506 
 BorrowerIncome00  4.0524 0.2996 3.9811 3.4741  5.3888 
 CoApplicant00  0.5939 0.1125 0.6000 0.1579  1.0000 
 Conventional00  0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000  0.0077 
 CreditProblem00  0.0492 0.0409 0.0395 0.0000  0.2464 
 FHA00  0.1208 0.1133 0.0865 0.0000  0.7082 
 HomeValue00  4.3170 0.5172 4.2443 2.9764  7.3513 
 HomeValue90  4.1478 0.5468 4.0652 1.0356  7.4712 
 Institutions00  3.6238 0.4093 3.6636 1.3863  4.7791 
 OOHousing00  0.8424 0.1154 0.8693 0.0167  1.0371 
 Originate00  5.0242 3.6281 4.0999 0.1656  37.2477 
 UnsoldLoan00  0.5578 0.1272 0.5433 0.2264  1.0000 
Banking-Market-Specific Factors    
 BAccess99  0.0140 0.0159 0.0079 0.0001  0.1318 
 Deposits99  1.9651 1.2439 1.7514 0.0350  6.7921 
 Efficiency00  0.7088 0.0591 0.7065 0.5955  0.8860 
 Herfindahl00  0.1343 0.0369 0.1359 0.0599  0.2871 
 LenderCost99  0.0504 0.0123 0.0459 0.0355  0.0865 
 MarketProfit94  0.0345 0.0099 0.0345 0.0087  0.0611 
 MarketProfit99  0.0464 0.0142 0.0468 0.0085  0.0848 
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Table 2: List of Regressors 
 
BAccess04    Deposits04    Originate04    Spread04 
           
Applications00    Applications00    Applications00    Applications00 
BankShare00    BankShare00    BankShare00    BankShare00 
BorrowerIncome00    BorrowerIncome00    BorrowerIncome00    BorrowerIncome00 
ChildInFamily00    ChildInFamily00    ChildInFamily00    ChildInFamily00 
CoApplicant00    CoApplicant00    CoApplicant00    CoApplicant00 
Conventional00    Conventional00    Conventional00    Conventional00 
Efficiency00    Efficiency00    Efficiency00    Efficiency00 
FHA00    FHA00    FHA00    FHA00 
Herfindahl00    Herfindahl00    Herfindahl00    Herfindahl00 
HighSchool00    HighSchool00    HighSchool00    HighSchool00 
HomeValue00    HomeValue00    HomeValue00    HomeValue00 
HomeValue90    HomeValue90    HomeValue90    HomeValue90 
Income00    Income00    Income00    Income00 
Income90    Income90   Income90   Income90 
Institutions00    Institutions00    Institutions00    Institutions00 
Jobs00    Jobs00    Jobs00    Jobs00 
ˆ λ     ˆ λ     ˆ λ     ˆ λ  
Manufacturing00    Manufacturing00    Manufacturing00    Manufacturing00 
Originate2000    Originate2000    Originate2000    Originate2000 
Population00    Population00    Population00    Population00 
Population90    Population90    Population90    Population90 
Race00    Race00    Race00    Race00 
RuralPop00    RuralPop00    RuralPop00    RuralPop00 
ShortCommute00    ShortCommute00    ShortCommute00    ShortCommute00 
UnsoldLoan00   UnsoldLoan00    UnsoldLoan00   UnsoldLoan00 
    CreditProblem00   CreditProblem00   CreditProblem00 
OOHousing00       OOHousing00   OOHousing00 
LenderCost99    LenderCost99        LenderCost99 
Retired00    Retired00   Retired00    
MarketProfit99    MarketProfit99         
HighSchool90   HighSchool90         
Manufacturing90   Manufacturing90        
MarketProfit94   MarketProfit94         
BAccess99   BAccess99         
Deposits99   Deposits99         
       Spread04    
          Originate04 
       BAccess04    BAccess04 
       Deposits04    Deposits04 
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Table 3: The Effect of Branch Presence on Mortgage Availability in Low - Moderate Income 
Neighborhoods – GMM with Exogenous Branch Presence in 1999 
 
This table shows the effect of bank branch presence in 1999, BAccess99, on mortgage availability by 
estimating the following system with GMM: 
 
Originate04 =  f  (BAccess99, Spread04, Retired00, X1) + εO 
Spread04 =  f  (BAccess99, Originate04, LenderCost00, X1) + εS 
 
R-square is the squared-correlation of the observed endogenous variable with its predicted value. 
 
t-statistics are in parenthesis.  Some of the variables in X1 are omitted from the Table for expositional 
reasons. 
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Originate2004  Spread2004 
BAccess99 25.186    -15.404 
 (4.01) ***   (-3.21) *** 
Deposits99 -0.105    0.066 
 (-0.90)    (0.96) 
Race00 1.738    -1.081 
 (1.94) *   (-1.72) * 
ShortCommute00 4.460    -2.818 
 (2.91) ***   (-2.79) *** 
BankShare00 0.433    -0.351 
 (0.80)    (-1.09) 
Income90 -0.627    0.377 
 (-1.45)    (1.41) 
Income00 -0.289    0.202 
 (-0.48)    (0.56) 
HighSchool00 -6.660    4.314 
 (-3.16) ***  (3.17) *** 
Institutions00 0.040    -0.021 
 (0.15)    (-0.13) 
HomeValue00 -0.459    0.250 
 (-1.03)    (0.94) 
UnsoldLoan00 1.268    -0.650 
 (1.89) *  (-1.44) 
ChildInFamily00 1.036    -1.093 
 (0.51)    (-0.92) 
Jobs00 4.859    -2.969 
 (2.20) **   (-2.29) ** 
Manufacturing00 -2.391    1.380 
 (-2.17) **  (2.25) ** 
CreditProblem00 0.206    -0.093 
 (0.22)    (-0.16) 
LenderCost00     -1.788 
     (-1.07) 
Retired00 -0.303     
 (-0.45)     
Efficiency00 1.128    -0.715 
 (1.37)    (-1.47) 
Herfindahl00 -1.986    1.209 
 (-1.30)    (1.26) 
RuralPop00 -0.376    0.242 
 (-1.18)    (1.21) 
ˆ λ   3.041   -1.930 
 (3.83) ***   (-3.53) *** 
R-square 0.72    0.26 
(***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: The Effect of Branch Presence on Mortgage Availability in Low - Moderate Income 
Neighborhoods – GMM with Exogenous Branch Presence in 2004 
 
This table shows the effect of bank branch presence in 2004, BAccess04, on mortgage availability by 
estimating the following system with GMM: 
 
Originate04 =  f  (BAccess04, Spread04, Retired00, X1) + εO 
Spread04 =  f  (BAccess04, Originate04, LenderCost00, X1) + εS 
 
R-square is the squared-correlation of the observed endogenous variable with its predicted value. 
 
t-statistics are in parenthesis.  Some of the variables in X1 are omitted from the Table for expositional 
reasons. 
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Originate2004  Spread2004 
BAccess04 32.152    -19.863 
 (3.56) ***  (-2.56) ** 
Deposits04 -0.171    0.113 
 (-1.56)    (1.95) * 
Race00 0.844    -0.485 
 (1.01)    (-0.81) 
ShortCommute00 2.437    -1.702 
 (1.88) *   (-1.93) * 
BankShare00 0.673    -0.513 
 (1.17)    (-1.60) 
Income90 -0.547    0.359 
 (-1.31)    (1.39) 
Income00 -0.456    0.265 
 (-0.78)    (0.78) 
HighSchool00 -3.952    2.843 
 (-2.41) **  (2.44) ** 
Institutions00 0.126    -0.062 
 (0.46)    (-0.38) 
HomeValue00 -0.320    0.188 
 (-0.78)    (0.76) 
UnsoldLoan00 1.615    -0.697 
 (2.50) **  (-1.54) 
ChildInFamily00 1.097    -1.179 
 (0.55)    (-1.03) 
Jobs00 4.309    -2.922 
 (1.97) *   (-2.40) ** 
Manufacturing00 -2.026    1.263 
 (-1.83) *  (2.11) ** 
CreditProblem00 -0.190    0.128 
 (-0.21)    (0.23) 
LenderCost00     -2.354 
     (-1.16) 
Retired00 -0.956     
 (-1.11)     
Efficiency00 0.892    -0.651 
 (1.12)    (-1.35) 
Herfindahl00 -0.294    0.202 
 (-0.22)    (0.24) 
RuralPop00 -0.324    0.183 
 (-1.07)    (0.95) 
ˆ λ   1.825   -1.269 
 (2.93) ***   (-2.64) *** 
R-square 0.73    0.28 
 (***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Branch Presence on Mortgage Availability in Low - Moderate Income 
Neighborhoods – GMM with Endogenous Branch Presence 
 
This table shows the effect of endogenous bank branch presence, BAccess04, and endogenous savings rate in 
2004, Deposits04, on mortgage availability by estimating the following system with GMM: 
 
Originate04 =  f  (BAccess04, Spread04, Deposits04, Retired00, CreditProblem00, OOHousing00, X2) + εO 
Spread04 =  f  (BAccess04, Originate04, Deposits04, LenderCost00, CreditProblem00, OOHousing00, X2) + εS 
BAccess04 =  f  (BAccess99, Deposits99, Retired00, LenderCost00, OOHousing00, X3) + ε B 
Deposits04 =  f  (BAccess99, Deposits99, Retired00, LenderCost00, CreditProblem00, X3) + ε D 
 
R-square is the squared-correlation of the observed endogenous variable with its predicted value. 
 
t-statistics are in parenthesis.  Some of the variables in X1 are omitted from the Table for expositional 
reasons. 
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Originate2004   Spread2004 
BAccess04 43.830    -28.185 
 (3.99) ***   (-2.69) *** 
Deposits04 -0.111    0.066 
 (-0.86)    (0.81) 
Race00 1.490    -0.933 
 (1.74) *  (-1.31) 
ShortCommute00 3.232    -2.323 
 (2.53) ***   (-2.35) *** 
BankShare00 0.550    -0.431 
 (0.98)    (-1.25) 
Income90 -0.551    0.373 
 (-1.36)    (1.36) 
Income00 -0.234    0.163 
 (-0.39)    (0.43) 
HighSchool00 -5.061    3.755 
 (-2.81) ***  (2.66) *** 
Institutions00 0.064    -0.049 
 (0.24)    (-0.27) 
HomeValue00 -0.506    0.295 
 (-1.19)    (1.07) 
UnsoldLoan00 1.417    -0.768 
 (2.16) **  (-1.49) 
ChildInFamily00 0.532    -0.847 
 (0.27)    (-0.69) 
Jobs00 4.915    -3.375 
 (2.34) ***   (-2.55) *** 
Manufacturing00 -2.203    1.424 
 (-2.08) ***  (2.26) *** 
CreditProblem00 0.218    -0.111 
 (0.25)    (-0.19) 
LenderCost00     -2.145 
     (-1.02) 
Retired00 -0.564     
 (-0.61)     
Efficiency00 1.058    -0.760 
 (1.33)    (-1.49) 
Herfindahl00 -0.705    0.580 
 (-0.53)    (0.66) 
RuralPop00 -0.230    0.145 
  (-0.75)  (0.70) 
ˆ λ   2.595   -1.801 
(3.69) ***   (-2.91) *** 
R-square 0.75    0.24 
 (***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Robustness Checks 
 




BAccess04 11.887  -1.046 
 (0.12)  (-0.05) 
R-square 0.68  0.20 
 
 
Panel B.  The Effect of Alternative Radii in Low - Moderate Income Neighborhoods 
 
  5 miles  20 miles 
  Originate2004 Spread2004 Originate2004  Spread2004
BAccess04 42.634  -24.214    21.893   -11.611 
 (4.49) *** (-3.66) ***    (4.38) ***   (-3.60) *** 
R-square 0.71  0.26  0.70    0.28 
 
 
Panel C.  The Effect of Ignoring Branch Proximity on the Estimated Effect of Branch 
Presence on Mortgage Availability in Low - Moderate Income Neighborhoods 
 
  5 miles    10 miles 
 Originate2004 Spread2004   Originate2004    Spread2004
BAccess04 11.576  -6.720    13.222   -8.801 
 (2.49) ** (-2.16) **    (3.67) ***   (-2.63) *** 
R-square 0.72  0.27    0.71    0.24 
 
 
Panel D.  Is Distance Important? 
 
 Originate2004 Spread2004
BAccess04 49.605  -36.676 
 (4.30) *** (-3.42) *** 
BAccess04id -0.452  1.165 
 (-0.11)  (0.39) 
R-square 0.73  0.20 
 
(***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel E.  The Impact of Outliers (Low - Moderate Income Neighborhoods) 
 
  Winsorized Sample    BAccess04 Redefined 
 Originate2004 Spread2004   Originate2004    Spread2004
BAccess04 32.572  -10.743    41.275   -25.369 
 (3.82) *** (-1.64)*    (3.79) ***   (-2.78) *** 




Panel F.  Population Density (Low - Moderate Income Neighborhoods) 
 
 Originate2004 Spread2004
BAccess04 49.858  -28.689 
 (4.02) *** (-2.51) ** 
R-square 0.78  0.41 
 
 
(***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   3
Figure 1. Creating Stable Census Tract Boundaries 
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Appendix A.  The computation of  MarketProfit99 
The idea behind the computation of the profitability of the banking market in 
and around a census tract is similar in spirit to the technique used by Amel and Liang 
(1997) in estimating the profitability of a market at the county level.  I proceed as 
follows. 
1. For each census tract, I find all bank branches within 20 miles of the census 
tract centroid. 
2. I aggregate the deposits in those branches at the institution level if multiple 
branches belong to the same institution. 
3. I choose the banks that raise 50% or more of their deposits from the area within 
20 miles of a census tract.  These are essentially small banks that do most of their 
business in the area.  I will assume that their profitability is the profitability of doing 
business in that area. 
4. To preclude the possibility of capturing a large bank that reports its 
aggregated deposits at its headquarters, I delete banks larger than $1 billion in total 
assets. 




Interest Income from Loans Interest ExpenseonDeposits





Note that this measure excludes the factors that may affect profitability at the institution 
level but are not related to the profitability of the market, such as the cost of other debt, 
which would be affected by the bank’s access to capital markets, or non-interest 
expenses, which may be affected by the bank’s operational efficiency.   5



















where n is the number of institutions and Di is the total deposits of bank i. 